Cybersecurity of Pakisthan : Structure, Strengths, Weaknesses, and the Way Forward in the era of 2025

Pakistan’s rapid digital transformation has made cybersecurity a national priority. With over a hundred million internet users and critical services going online, the country faces escalating cyber threats to government agencies, businesses, and citizens. In recent years, Pakistan has taken significant steps to build a cybersecurity framework – from new laws and policies to dedicated cyber units – yet challenges remain. This blog post provides a comprehensive look at Cybersecurity of Pakisthan : its structure and key components, strengths and advancements, persistent weaknesses, and its effectiveness in a global context. We will also examine case studies of major cyber incidents in Pakistan, explore how cybersecurity intersects with national security and economic stability, and offer actionable recommendations to bolster Pakistan’s cyber resilience. The goal is to present an informative, accessible overview for general readers, technology professionals, and policymakers alike. 

Structure and Key Components of Cybersecurity of Pakisthan Infrastructure 

Pakistan’s cybersecurity infrastructure is evolving as a multi-stakeholder ecosystem, involving several government bodies, law enforcement agencies, regulators, and emerging private-sector initiatives. Key components include specialized cybercrime units, regulatory authorities, national policy frameworks, and nascent public-private partnerships. Below is an outline of the major players and their roles: 

• Ministry of Information Technology & Telecommunication (MoITT) – The MoITT leads national cybersecurity policy development and coordination. It spearheaded the formulation of Pakistan’s first National Cyber Security Policy in 2021. The policy envisions a central governance structure for cybersecurity, emphasizing that success depends on “people, process and technology” and calling for a dedicated federal department to coordinate cybersecurity across national, sectoral, and organizational levels. Under MoITT’s umbrella, the ministry also drafted the Personal Data Protection Bill (PDPB) to address data privacy (discussed later). Overall, MoITT sets strategic direction and works with other agencies to implement cybersecurity initiatives. 

• National Response Centre for Cyber Crimes (NR3C) – Established in 2007 as a wing of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), NR3C is Pakistan’s lead law enforcement unit for cybercrime investigation. It is empowered by the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) 2016 to investigate offenses like hacking, unauthorized access, financial fraud, cyber terrorism, and other electronic crimes. With headquarters in Islamabad and regional offices, NR3C handles digital forensics, complaint response, and works with INTERPOL on transnational cases. However, NR3C faces capacity constraints (limited manpower, training, and equipment) which impact its effectiveness – an issue examined in a later section. 

• Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) – The PTA is the telecom and internet regulator established under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996. Traditionally known for managing spectrum and internet content regulation (blocking extremist or blasphemous websites), PTA has expanded into cybersecurity oversight for the telecom sector. It issued the Critical Telecom Data and Infrastructure Security Regulations (CTDISR) in 2022, formulating a Cyber Security Framework that obligates telecom operators to implement data protection measures and report incidents. PTA also launched a National Telecom Security Operations Center (NTSOC) to monitor and defend telecommunication infrastructure. The NTSOC connects telecom companies with a centralized Computer Emergency Response Team, enabling information sharing on threats and vulnerabilities. These steps aim to strengthen the resilience of Pakistan’s telecom networks against cyberattacks, given the sector’s importance for communication and critical services. 

• National Computer Emergency Response Team (National CERT or NCERT) – As part of the 2021 Cybersecurity Policy implementation, Pakistan is establishing a national CERT to act as a central hub for cyber incident response across all sectors. According to officials, the National CERT began initial operations in mid-2023 and is expected to be fully operational by 2025. This project is led by the National Telecommunication & Information Security Board (NTISB) under the Cabinet Division. The CERT Rules 2023, approved by the Cabinet and notified in September 2023, provide the legal framework for NCERT’s functions. Under these rules, Pakistan is adopting a three-tier CERT structure: 

• A National CERT at the federal level (NCERT) for overarching coordination. 

• Sectoral CERTs for critical domains like finance, telecom, energy, defense, etc., to handle industry-specific incidents. 

• Organizational CERTs within major institutions and companies to manage internal cybersecurity and report to sectoral CERTs. 

A National CERT Coordination Council has been formed to oversee and advise these teams. Essentially, this tiered approach mirrors international best practices by integrating efforts from the top level down to individual organizations. Once fully operational, NCERT will coordinate incident response, issue threat advisories, and facilitate cyber threat intelligence sharing nationwide. 

• National Telecommunication & Information Security Board (NTISB) – Housed in the Cabinet Division, NTISB is an inter-agency body historically responsible for secure communications and information security in government. It now plays a pivotal role in developing technical guidelines and issuing cybersecurity advisories to public-sector entities. For example, NTISB regularly circulates advisories about emerging vulnerabilities (such as critical software exploits) to government departments. It is also executing the NCERT project as noted above. NTISB’s collaboration with PTA has been formalized via a Memorandum of Understanding to share information and expertise for protecting Pakistan’s telecom infrastructure. In summary, NTISB acts as a behind-the-scenes coordinator for government cybersecurity efforts, ensuring policies decided at the top (MoITT and the Cyber Governance Policy Committee) are translated into technical action items for agencies. 

• Military and Intelligence Cyber Units – While much of Pakistan’s cyber apparatus is civilian, the military and intelligence services also maintain significant cyber capabilities (though details are mostly classified). The armed forces established a Cyber Command under the Strategic Plans Division to handle cyber defense and possibly offensive operations in support of national security. Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and other intelligence agencies are reportedly involved in cyber-espionage and counter-cyber operations, given the strategic importance of cyberspace in espionage and warfare. For instance, threat intelligence reports have linked certain advanced persistent threat (APT) groups (like “APT-36” aka Transparent Tribe) to Pakistani state interests targeting regional adversaries. Though not publicly acknowledged in detail, Pakistan’s military-cyber linkage means that cybersecurity is also a domain of defense strategy, especially in the context of the country’s rivalry with India (discussed further in the global context section). 

• Financial Sector and Private Companies – The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), as the banking regulator, has introduced cybersecurity guidelines for financial institutions. In 2017, SBP issued a comprehensive framework on IT security and risk management for banks, mandating controls for internet banking, payment systems, and customer data protection. Banks are required to establish Security Operations Centers (SOCs), conduct regular audits, and report major cyber incidents to SBP. In practice, major Pakistani banks now have dedicated information security departments. The Pakistan Stock Exchange and major financial services also invest in cyber defenses to guard against fraud and system breaches. 

Beyond finance, large telecom operators (e.g. PTCL, Jazz, Telenor) and other critical infrastructure companies (power utilities, airlines) form the front-line of cyber defense for their networks. They often collaborate with law enforcement and regulators during incidents. In recent years, Pakistani private firms and academia have also taken initiative in cybersecurity: for example, the National Centre for Cyber Security (NCCS) was established in 2018 as a consortium of R&D labs across 11 universities to innovate in cyber defense technologies. There are also professional organizations like the Pakistan Information Security Association (PISA), which runs a volunteer CERT and participates in international cyber drills such as the OIC-CERT exercises. These private and academic efforts complement government structures by providing skilled talent, research, and incident response support on the ground. 

In summary, Pakistan’s cybersecurity infrastructure consists of a matrix of institutions: policy-making bodies (MoITT, committees), enforcement agencies (FIA NR3C, law enforcement), regulators (PTA, SBP), specialized coordinating units (NCERT/NTISB), and support from the private sector and academia. This multi-layered structure is still maturing – coordination among these players is critical to a coherent cybersecurity posture. The National Cyber Security Policy 2021 explicitly called for clarifying the governance structure and establishing a central authority to avoid fragmentation. As we examine next, Pakistan has made progress in laying down policies and systems, but it also faces notable strengths and weaknesses within this framework. 

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Strengths and Advancements in Cybersecurity of Pakisthan 

Despite being a relatively late entrant to formal cybersecurity (Pakistan’s first national cyber policy came in 2021), the country has developed some significant strengths and seen recent advancements that improve its security posture. These include robust legal foundations, new institutional frameworks, capacity-building initiatives, and rising international recognition of its efforts. 

1. Legal Framework and Cybercrime Law Enforcement: Pakistan’s primary cybersecurity law, the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) 2016, provides a comprehensive base to prosecute cyber offenses. PECA criminalizes a range of activities – unauthorized access to systems or data, financial fraud, cyber-stalking, identity theft, and cyber-terrorism – and lays out investigation procedures and penalties. Under PECA, service providers must retain traffic data for at least one year and furnish it to investigators with a court warrant. Crucially, PECA called for the establishment of a dedicated Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) to handle threats to critical infrastructure. While that national CERT took years to materialize, the law at least recognized its necessity. PECA also empowers agencies like FIA’s NR3C to pursue cybercriminals, which has led to notable enforcement actions. For example, FIA has busted rings involved in cyber-fraud and harassment, and in 2018 its cyber unit arrested hackers who had stolen data from banks (as described in case studies later). The existence of a cybercrime law and an operational enforcement unit is a strength – many developing countries still lack these basics. 

2. National Cyber Security Policy 2021: The approval of Pakistan’s first comprehensive cybersecurity policy in July 2021 marked a major milestone. The National Cyber Security Policy (NCSP) 2021 lays out a multi-faceted strategy to bolster cyber defenses. Key objectives of the policy include establishing governance structures for cybersecurity, upgrading critical information infrastructure, promoting data protection and privacy, fostering public awareness, and enhancing national and global cooperation. The policy enumerates 17 distinct deliverables covering governance, technology, human resources, and cyber awareness. Significantly, it created a high-level Cyber Governance Policy Committee (CGPC) to oversee implementation and to resolve the longstanding issue of “who owns” cybersecurity at the federal level. The CGPC’s proposals must get Federal Cabinet approval, ensuring top-level political backing for cybersecurity initiatives. The policy also calls for developing indigenous cybersecurity solutions and emphasizes that building a strong cybersecurity culture (through education and awareness) is just as important as technical measures. Overall, NCSP 2021 provides Pakistan with a clear vision and blueprint for improving cybersecurity – something that was absent before. Early signs of implementation are visible (e.g., the CERT framework and capacity building discussed below), though full execution will be an ongoing challenge. 

3. New Institutions and Response Mechanisms: In line with its new policy, Pakistan has stood up or upgraded several institutions: 

• The National CERT (PKCERT): As detailed earlier, Pakistan’s national CERT is becoming operational, with personnel hiring and capability acquisition underway to meet a mid-2025 full launch. Even in soft-launch mode since mid-2023, NCERT has started issuing advisories. It has, for instance, warned about global data breaches affecting Pakistani users and offered guidance on protective measures. When fully functional, NCERT will greatly enhance Pakistan’s ability to coordinate responses to incidents across different sectors and provinces. 

• Sectoral CERTs and Cybersecurity Units: Several sectors now have their own CERT-like bodies or cyber units. The National Telecom SOC (NTSOC) under PTA is one such specialized center focusing on telecom networks. The financial sector has bank-specific incident response teams and a forum under SBP’s guidance. Some government ministries (e.g., Defense, Foreign Affairs) have set up information security cells to protect their networks. This distributed network of CERTs means incidents can be handled by domain experts and then escalated to NCERT for cross-sector or national-level issues – a more efficient arrangement than a one-size-fits-all approach. 

• Improved Cyber Threat Monitoring: Regulatory frameworks have been updated to enforce better monitoring. PTA’s Cyber Security Framework (2022) requires telecom licensees to log and report any data breaches or cyber incidents to the regulator. This is a shift from the past when breaches often went unreported. Similarly, SBP mandates banks to promptly notify the central bank of any major cybersecurity incidents. These measures strengthen early warning and knowledge of threat trends, a key element in resilience. 

4. Capacity Building and Skill Development: Recognizing the shortage of skilled cybersecurity professionals, Pakistan has ramped up training and education: 

• Academic Programs: Cybersecurity degree programs and certifications are expanding. Several universities (NUST, COMSATS, NED, Air University, etc.) now offer specialized programs in information security or cyber defense. The Higher Education Commission’s backing of NCCS led to research labs that also train students in areas like cyber forensics and malware analysis. 

• Government Training Initiatives: The government has initiated training for officials. For instance, the MoITT has programs to train young people in cybersecurity, which the IT Minister credited as a factor in Pakistan’s improved global cybersecurity ranking. Law enforcement officers at FIA NR3C undergo digital forensics training and workshops often in collaboration with international agencies. 

• Awareness Campaigns: Public awareness is gradually rising. National Cyber Security Awareness seminars and media campaigns educate businesses and citizens on basic cyber hygiene. The response to a spate of banking frauds led to banks and telecom providers sending advisories to customers about phishing scams and OTP (one-time password) fraud prevention. While challenges remain (as many users still fall prey to scams), the conversation about cybersecurity is at least becoming mainstream. 

5. International Cooperation and Recognition: Pakistan has started engaging more with the international cybersecurity community: 

• In May 2023, Pakistan joined the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (GFCE) as its 107th member. The GFCE is a multistakeholder platform for cyber capacity-building, and Pakistan’s membership signals its commitment to learning best practices and contributing to global efforts. 

• Pakistan also aligned itself with a new UN-led cybercrime treaty in late 2024, which was initiated by Russia and China, reflecting its preference for multilateral frameworks that respect state sovereignty. Additionally, Pakistan has voiced support for UN norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace and participates in forums like the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on ICT security. 

• A tangible measure of Pakistan’s progress is its dramatic rise in the Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) by the International Telecommunication Union. In 2021, Pakistan ranked 79th worldwide on the GCI; by 2024, it had vaulted into the top tier of countries – placed among the 46 leading nations in cybersecurity commitment. Pakistan’s GCI score (96.69 out of 100 in the 2024 assessment) reflects improvements across legal, technical, organizational, capacity-building, and cooperation measures. The report specifically praised Pakistan’s advancements in updating laws, building institutions, training skills, and strengthening incident response capabilities. Being listed in Tier 1 alongside countries like the US, Singapore, and Malaysia is a notable recognition of Pakistan’s efforts. 

While the high GCI ranking is encouraging, it mainly indicates that Pakistan has put the right frameworks in place. The real-world effectiveness of these measures is a separate question (which we address in weaknesses). Nonetheless, the country’s cybersecurity trajectory is clearly upward. As one commentary noted, Pakistan’s rise in the index “shows promise” and underscores that continuous investment is needed for true resilience. The strengths outlined – legal tools, policy direction, institutions like CERTs, growing talent, and global engagement – form a solid foundation upon which Pakistan can build a safer cyber ecosystem. 

Major Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities in Pakistan’s Cybersecurity System 

Despite progress, Pakistan’s cybersecurity defenses have significant gaps and vulnerabilities. Structural issues, resource limitations, and delayed reforms hamper the country’s ability to fully secure its digital landscape. Here are the major weaknesses: 

1. Fragmented Governance and Lack of Central Authority: Pakistan’s cyber governance has suffered from institutional fragmentation. Responsibility is split among multiple agencies (MoITT, PTA, FIA/NR3C, NTISB, etc.) with overlapping mandates and sometimes unclear lines of authority. Until recently, there was no single empowered cybersecurity agency or “czar” to unify efforts. The National Cyber Security Policy 2021 aimed to solve this by creating coordination committees, but in practice the ecosystem still operates in silos. This fragmentation leads to incoherent strategy implementation – for example, different ministries may pursue their own cybersecurity initiatives without aligning with each other, and information sharing is inconsistent. The Stimson Center analysis notes that the dispersion of cybersecurity issues across multiple bodies has “undercut coherence,” reflecting a deeper dilemma of modernizing defenses without diluting institutional turf. Until the new governance structures (like the Cyber Governance Policy Committee and NCERT) fully assert themselves, this lack of unity remains a vulnerability. 

2. Gaps in Legal and Policy Coverage: While PECA 2016 established a base framework, experts highlight that it lacks provisions in key areas. Notably, PECA does not explicitly address critical infrastructure protection or impose mandatory cybersecurity standards on operators of essential services. There are no clear legal requirements for sectors like energy, healthcare, or transport to implement cybersecurity measures or report breaches (beyond voluntary guidelines). Additionally, data protection legislation is still pending – Pakistan does not yet have an enacted personal data protection law as of 2025. The draft Personal Data Protection Bill has lingered since 2018 (updated in 2021 and 2023 drafts) but is not passed. This means there are weak incentives for organizations to secure personal data or inform users of breaches. Without data breach notification laws, many incidents likely go unreported. Moreover, Pakistan has no formal cybersecurity regulatory authority outside of specific domains like banking and telecom. As one analysis put it, “No independent cybersecurity authority exists” to enforce standards across the board. The policy environment, though improved with NCSP 2021, also suffers from slow implementation. Over two years since the policy launch, some initiatives (like the NCERT) are delayed and others – such as establishing sectoral regulatory frameworks – remain on paper. In summary, Pakistan’s legal and regulatory regime has holes that sophisticated adversaries can exploit, especially in unregulated sectors. 

3. Limited Resources and Skilled Manpower: A fundamental weakness is the shortage of trained cybersecurity professionals and advanced technological resources: 

• Human Capital Shortage: Pakistan faces a pronounced cyber talent gap. Both public agencies and private companies struggle to recruit and retain qualified cybersecurity experts given global competition. FIA’s NR3C, for instance, has a small team relative to the volume of cybercrime cases nationwide. The unit’s investigations often face delays partly due to not having enough specialized investigators and forensic analysts. The judiciary also lacks cyber expertise – prosecutors and judges are still catching up on technical concepts, leading to low conviction rates for cyber offenses. In many government departments, IT staff double-up for cybersecurity roles without adequate training. The Tribune’s analysis notes that many institutions lack “skilled personnel to implement comprehensive cybersecurity measures,” and the shortage of professionals is a “significant bottleneck” for Pakistan. While training programs are growing, the current workforce is insufficient for the threats at hand. 

• Funding and Technology Constraints: Cybersecurity budgets in the public sector are limited. Upgrading legacy systems, deploying new security tools, and conducting regular audits require funding that many departments do not have. A stark example was the FBR (tax authority) hack in 2021 – the breach was attributed to an unpatched old version of Microsoft’s Hyper-V virtualization software. The failure to update critical software and infrastructure is often due to budget and bureaucracy issues. Similarly, law enforcement units may lack advanced cyber forensics labs or monitoring infrastructure. Even the NCERT project – crucial as it is – took years to fund and implement, indicating resource challenges. On the private side, many businesses in Pakistan, especially small and medium enterprises, do not invest in cybersecurity beyond basic antivirus, leaving them vulnerable to ransomware and data theft. Outdated systems and insufficient defenses in both government and industry create soft targets for attackers. 

4. Weak Critical Infrastructure Security: Pakistan’s critical infrastructure sectors (energy, telecom, banking, transportation) have been repeatedly shown to be vulnerable. Some weaknesses include: 

• Power and Utilities: As will be detailed in case studies, the country’s largest private electricity provider, K-Electric, suffered a major ransomware attack in 2020 that disrupted billing services. More worrying, officials have quietly noted attempted intrusions into power grid controls – a successful cyberattack on the grid could cause blackouts. Many industrial control systems (ICS) in utilities run on outdated software and are not isolated from corporate IT networks, increasing exposure. 

• Financial Systems: Pakistani banks have improved security post-2018, but earlier that year hackers stole data of nearly 20,000 credit/debit cards from 22 banks via a card skimming campaign. This incident (detailed later) showed gaps in payment security. While banks have since adopted EMV chip cards and two-factor authentication for online transactions, fraud and digital heists remain a threat, especially as many customers are not digitally literate. The State Bank revealed in late 2021 that its systems face tens of thousands of cyberattacks monthly, indicating persistent attempts to breach financial databases. 

• Telecom and Government Networks: PTA and NADRA (the national ID database authority) have been targets of data leaks. In 2023–24, a major breach exposed personal data (including ID card copies, phone logs, and travel records) of 2.7 million Pakistanis – reportedly siphoned from NADRA’s systems integrated with mobile SIM registration databases. Additionally, government websites are frequently defaced by hacktivists, and malware infections in ministries have occurred (often via phishing emails). The cyber hygiene in many public-sector organizations is poor, with irregular patch management and employees susceptible to social engineering. This was evident when even high officials’ data appeared in leaks being sold online. 

These examples point to an overall vulnerability in protecting critical assets. Part of the issue is that until recently there were no mandatory cybersecurity standards or audits for critical infrastructure operators. Unlike some countries, Pakistan has not yet designated specific entities as “Critical Information Infrastructure” with regulated security requirements (though the NCSP policy alludes to doing so). This gap means that how well, say, a power company or a hospital secures itself is largely left to that organization’s discretion – which can be a recipe for inconsistency. 

5. Low Cybersecurity Awareness and Culture: A subtler weakness is the lack of a strong cybersecurity culture among the general public and many organizations. Public awareness of cyber risks in Pakistan is improving but still low in large segments of society. Cybercrime complaints (for fraud, harassment, etc.) have surged, implying many users still fall victim to scams. Phishing and social engineering remain rampant – for example, schemes involving fake prize calls or impersonation of officials on WhatsApp routinely trick people into revealing banking information. At the corporate leadership level, there has historically been a tendency to undervalue cybersecurity (viewing it as an IT issue rather than a boardroom priority). This is gradually changing due to high-profile incidents, but many companies still do not conduct regular cybersecurity training for staff or have incident response plans. The education system only recently started integrating cybersecurity topics; hence, most of the workforce lacks formal training on digital security practices. As the IBA’s legal analysis concluded, Pakistan is in an “early stage” of developing a cyber-secure environment; building a pervasive security-conscious culture will take time. 

6. Slow Pace of Institutional Reform: Finally, bureaucracy and politics have slowed some needed reforms. For instance, the effort to establish a central cyber authority or even to pass the data protection law has been delayed by changes in government and concerns from stakeholders (businesses worried about compliance costs, etc.). Meanwhile, emerging threats like ransomware gangs, state-sponsored espionage, and cyber espionage require agility in response, which is hard to achieve when new policies take years to approve. Pakistan’s decision to stay outside certain international frameworks (like the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime) over sovereignty concerns may also limit its access to some cooperative tools for cross-border crime investigation. Balancing sovereignty with effective cooperation is a tightrope, and critics argue Pakistan has erred on the side of caution, potentially at the expense of quicker capacity gains. 

In summary, Pakistan’s cyber defenses have notable weaknesses: an under-resourced and patchy infrastructure, incomplete legal mandates, insufficient skilled manpower, and legacy systems prone to attack. These gaps mean that despite improvements on paper, the country remains vulnerable to determined adversaries. As one policy analyst observed, the “frequency of cybercrimes, fraud, and scams remains high” in Pakistan despite new policies, indicating a mismatch between formal progress and ground reality. The next sections will illustrate this reality through case studies and then place Pakistan’s cybersecurity posture in a global context, including how it fares against transnational threats. 

Cybersecurity of Pakisthan Posture in the Global Context 

Pakistan’s cybersecurity posture does not exist in isolation – it is influenced by and contributes to the broader global cyber landscape. In the international arena, Pakistan seeks to balance protecting its national sovereignty in cyberspace with the need to cooperate against global cyber threats. The country’s stance, partnerships, and adversaries all shape how effective its cybersecurity measures are on the world stage. 

1. Sovereignty-First Approach vs International Frameworks: Pakistan has generally adopted a cautious approach to international cyber governance, prioritizing state sovereignty and control over digital infrastructure. For example, Pakistan has refrained from signing the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, largely due to concerns that it would allow external jurisdictions to access Pakistani data or impose foreign oversight. Instead, Pakistan aligns with UN processes like the OEWG and advocates that the UN Charter principles (e.g. non-intervention, state equality) apply in cyberspace. This position is in line with countries like China and Russia, and Pakistan indeed supported the new Russia/China-led UN Cybercrime Convention adopted in 2024. The benefit of this approach is that Pakistan maintains full control of its cyber jurisdiction and resists external pressure on issues like data requests. The downside is that Pakistan doesn’t take advantage of established international instruments for cooperation (like streamlined evidence sharing under Budapest). However, Pakistan has shown willingness to engage multilaterally on capacity building – joining the GFCE, as mentioned, and calling for international funds to help developing countries secure cyberspace. 

2. Regional Cybersecurity Dynamics – The Indo-Pak Rivalry: In South Asia, Pakistan’s cybersecurity posture is heavily influenced by its geopolitical tensions, especially with India. Over the last decade, India-Pakistan relations have extended into cyberspace, becoming a “silent battlefield” of espionage and attacks. Pakistani and Indian hacker groups have frequently engaged in tit-for-tat defacements of websites, often timed around national holidays or political events. These were initially low-level “hacktivism” acts by patriotic hackers (e.g., the group Pakistan Cyber Army became notorious for defacing Indian sites). But the rivalry has since escalated to more serious cyber warfare and espionage: 

• Pakistani APTs: Security researchers have identified cyber espionage groups linked to Pakistan targeting Indian government, military, and diplomatic entities. A notable example is APT-36 (Transparent Tribe), which is “notorious for persistently targeting the Indian government and defence forces” to gather sensitive data. During the COVID-19 pandemic, APT-36 was observed launching phishing campaigns against Indian officials, blending into the crisis environment. Such groups likely operate with state encouragement, adding an offensive dimension to Pakistan’s cyber posture regionally. 

• Indian Cyber Operations: India, for its part, has bolstered its cyber capabilities with the formation of a Defence Cyber Agency in 2019, reportedly conducting offensive cyber operations against Pakistan in retaliation for cross-border terrorism. Indian agencies have been accused of deploying spyware (like the Pegasus malware) on Pakistani targets and breaching Pakistani government servers. For instance, there have been reports (though not officially confirmed) of Indian hackers compromising Pakistani critical systems or leaking data in response to incidents in Kashmir. 

• Recent Escalations: The year 2025 saw a sharp uptick in cyber activity parallel to kinetic clashes. After a terror attack in Kashmir in April 2025, Indian CERT warned of a spike in cyber threats targeting financial institutions and critical sectors from Pakistan-linked actors. Indeed, Indian authorities recorded over 1.5 million cyber attacks in the weeks following, including DDoS attacks and malware, many traced back to or coordinated from Pakistan (as well as some from sympathizers in other countries). Pakistani hacktivist groups publicly claimed responsibility for some attacks on Indian government sites in that period. At the same time, Pakistan alleged Indian hackers were trying to infiltrate its defense networks. While these cyber skirmishes did not cause large-scale damage, they highlighted that any future India-Pakistan conflict will likely feature a cyber front. 

For Pakistan, this rivalry means that its cybersecurity readiness is also a national security imperative. The state must not only protect against generic cybercrime but against capable adversaries possibly backed by foreign intelligence. It has prompted Pakistan to integrate cyber operations into its military strategy as a “hybrid warfare” tool. The synergy with allied countries is also noteworthy – Pakistan’s close defense partnership with China extends to cyberspace, with potential collaboration on cyber defense and technology sharing. In the global context, such regional tensions put Pakistan’s cybersecurity under constant stress and test its resilience. 

3. Transnational Cybercrime and Terrorism: Pakistan also faces cross-border cyber threats from criminal networks and terrorist organizations. Cybercriminal gangs operating from Eastern Europe, Africa, or other regions do target Pakistani banks and companies with ransomware or financial scams. Likewise, Pakistani cybercriminals have victimized targets abroad – for example, the Gorgon Group, a hacking outfit believed to be Pakistan-based, has been found conducting cybercrime and targeting government agencies in the US and Europe. The Gorgon Group used commodity malware (like TrickBot and LokiBot) to steal data and money globally, blurring the line between pure crime and state-aligned espionage. The presence of such groups suggests that Pakistan is part of the international cybercrime ecosystem, both as a target and as a source. Law enforcement cooperation is crucial to tackle them – FIA’s membership in INTERPOL’s cybercrime initiatives and information sharing with foreign counterparts are steps in that direction. 

Terrorist groups have also leveraged cyberspace. Militant organizations in Pakistan and the region have used online propaganda and secure communications on the internet. The Pakistani government’s National Action Plan of 2014 explicitly included addressing cyber aspects of terrorism. Pakistan has shut down extremist online content and arrested individuals for running social media pages promoting terrorism under the cyber laws. However, terrorist actors constantly evolve their cyber tactics (e.g., using encryption, dark web forums), requiring Pakistan to keep improving its cyber intelligence and surveillance (while balancing privacy rights). 

4. International Collaboration and Reputation: Globally, Pakistan’s enhanced cybersecurity efforts have started yielding diplomatic and economic benefits. By improving its GCI ranking to Tier 1, Pakistan signaled to international investors and partners that it is serious about securing its digital economy. This can boost confidence for foreign tech companies considering operations in Pakistan. In fact, the IT minister noted that global tech firms (like Google) have begun investing in Pakistan’s tech sector, and a secure cyber environment is key to attracting more investment. On the diplomatic front, Pakistan’s active participation in shaping international cyber norms (through the UN) allows it to voice the concerns of developing countries and push for frameworks that ensure “digital sovereignty”. For example, Pakistan has advocated for capacity building on an equal footing so that all states can protect themselves – an issue it raised in its official position on international law’s application in cyberspace. By contributing to discussions on peaceful dispute resolution in cyberspace and confidence-building measures, Pakistan aligns itself as a responsible state actor online, at least in principle. 

That said, Pakistan must be mindful of Western concerns regarding internet freedom and privacy. Its cybersecurity governance includes strong content controls (by PTA) and there have been instances of internet shutdowns for security reasons. While these fall more under information control than technical cybersecurity, they influence perceptions. Western nations emphasize open, secure, and interoperable cyberspace. Any move by Pakistan that appears to overly restrict the internet (for instance, proposed laws like the earlier drafted “E-Safety Bill” to regulate online content) can create friction with Western ideals and potentially affect cooperation. Striking a balance between securing cyberspace and upholding digital rights is part of Pakistan’s global cybersecurity challenge. 

In the global context, Pakistan’s cybersecurity posture can be summarized as cautious but evolving. It is improving defenses and contributing to international norms in a way that guards its interests. The true test of this posture is how Pakistan responds to major cross-border cyber incidents – both as a victim and as an actor. Thus far, Pakistan has avoided any catastrophic cyber fallout internationally, but the interconnected nature of cyberspace means that weaknesses at home could have global repercussions (e.g., if Pakistan became a base for large-scale attacks elsewhere, or if a foreign attack on Pakistani infrastructure disrupted regional networks). The next section looks at concrete case studies of cyber incidents to ground the discussion in real examples, some of which have transnational elements. 

Case Studies of Recent Cyberattacks and Incidents 

To understand the practical state of cybersecurity in Pakistan, it’s instructive to review major cyber incidents from recent years. These case studies highlight both external threats and internal vulnerabilities, covering a range of sectors from finance to government to critical utilities. 

Case Study 1: 2018 Banking System Breach – The Biggest Banking Data Leak in Pakistan’s History. 
In late 2018, Pakistan suffered an unprecedented financial cyberattack when hackers compromised payment card data from numerous banks. It started with an incident at BankIslami on October 27, 2018, where the bank noticed abnormal transactions totaling ₨2.6 million (about $20,000) executed on international cards. The bank responded by temporarily shutting down its international payment services. Soon after, it emerged that the breach was not isolated – hackers had stolen the details of nearly 20,000 debit and credit cards from 22 Pakistani banks in a coordinated skimming operation. According to PakCERT (a private monitoring group), the card details (including card numbers, expiration dates, and CVVs) were dumped for sale on the dark web. Dark net users could purchase these and make fraudulent transactions until the cards were blocked. This was effectively a mass data breach of the banking sector. 

The State Bank of Pakistan and FIA NR3C stepped in to investigate. Banks across the country had to block thousands of cards and disable online transactions until systems were secured. Public confidence was shaken as some FIA officials initially stated “almost all banks” were hit and “a large amount of money” was stolen, though the central bank later clarified the banks’ core systems weren’t hacked (the breach occurred likely via compromised ATMs or third-party payment processors). Ultimately, while direct monetary loss was limited (BankIslami reimbursed customers the initial ₨2.6 million), the data of customers was exposed. This case underscored weak points like lack of EMV chip usage (at the time) and inadequate real-time fraud detection in some banks. It prompted swift upgrades: within months, most Pakistani banks shifted to chip-and-PIN cards and tightened online payment security. Regulators also instructed banks to improve network monitoring. Lesson: A systemic attack exploiting common weaknesses can impact multiple institutions at once, and information sharing (via PakCERT’s threat report) was crucial in alerting others. 

Case Study 2: 2020 K-Electric Ransomware Attack – Critical Infrastructure under Siege. 
On September 7, 2020, Karachi’s power utility K-Electric (KE) was hit by the notorious NetWalker ransomware. The attack disrupted KE’s online customer services – consumers could not access the billing portal, duplicate bill generation, or log complaints through the call center or SMS services. While electricity distribution itself continued (the operational grid was reportedly unaffected), the company’s business networks were locked down. The NetWalker group initially demanded a $3.85 million ransom to decrypt KE’s data, threatening to increase it to $7 million if not paid in a week. An international cybersecurity news site broke the story, and KE officially acknowledged the “cyber incident” a couple of days later under public pressure. 

Investigations suggested that hackers likely infiltrated KE via a phishing email or exposed remote access service, then deployed ransomware that encrypted critical servers. The attack raised fears of sensitive customer data being stolen – KE holds personal information of millions (names, addresses, national ID numbers, etc.). Cybersecurity experts pointed out Pakistan’s lack of breach disclosure laws meant consumers were left guessing if their data was safe. KE did not disclose whether it paid any ransom, but some stolen files were later leaked online when the deadline passed (as reported by security researchers). The KE attack was a wake-up call: it highlighted that critical infrastructure in Pakistan is vulnerable to global ransomware gangs who had hit targets in many countries. It also showed the potential risk to citizens’ data and essential services. Following this incident, PTA and NTISB urged other utilities to review their security, and the government accelerated work on the national CERT to better handle such events. Lesson: A ransomware attack on a major utility can cause significant disruption without even touching the core industrial controls, and in absence of user data protections, can put consumer privacy at risk. 

Case Study 3: 2021 FBR Data Center Hack – National Tax Agency Brought Down. 
Perhaps the most damaging cyberattack on a Pakistani government institution occurred over the Independence Day weekend in August 2021. The target was the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), which maintains one of Pakistan’s largest databases (holding taxpayers’ financial records, national IDs, and economic data). In the early hours of August 14, hackers managed to breach the FBR’s main data center in Islamabad, exploiting a vulnerability in Microsoft’s Hyper-V virtualization software. This led to a crash of the FBR’s virtual server environment. All FBR-operated websites and online services went down, including the tax filing portal and customs clearance system, causing nationwide disruption. It was described internally as a “national crisis-like situation”. 

The timing was deliberate – launching a major cyber assault on Pakistan’s independence day carries symbolism, and officials openly termed it “cyber terrorism on our Independence Day”. The attackers evidently had planned well; there were warning signs in the preceding days (increased attempts to breach FBR’s network) and even intelligence reports that FBR might be attacked, but these were unfortunately ignored or not acted upon in time. Once inside, the hackers damaged the virtual machine infrastructure, possibly to deploy malware or exfiltrate data, then making the systems unusable. FBR had to shut down all applications to contain the damage. It took the IT teams over two days to rebuild the servers and restore services, during which time trade and business faced delays – e.g., customs clearance for shipments stalled, disrupting supply chains. 

Post-incident analysis was scathing: it revealed that the FBR’s IT arm (PRAL) had not maintained proper security “hygiene” – critical patches were missing, and firewall defenses were inadequate. There were also suggestions of mismanagement and hiring of unqualified personnel in key IT security posts. Pakistan had to seek help from Microsoft’s emergency response team to recover. Although the full extent of data compromise wasn’t disclosed, the fact that the tax database might have been accessed raised alarms about national data sovereignty. A subsequent inquiry indicated that hostile foreign actors (some speculated an Indian state-sponsored group) were likely behind it, aiming to both embarrass Pakistan and gather intelligence. Lesson: The FBR hack shows how an attack on a single weak link (an unpatched software) in a critical government system can snowball into a nationwide disruption. It also underscores the need for proactive defense – prior intelligence warnings must be heeded to avoid such breaches. 

Case Study 4: 2019-2023 Data Leaks and Breaches – Personal Data of Citizens on the Dark Web. 
Beyond targeted attacks, Pakistan has also seen large-scale data leaks exposing citizens’ personal information. One of the most significant findings came out in 2023-24: a Joint Investigation Team reported that from 2019 to 2023, the credentials (personal records) of about 2.7 million Pakistanis had been compromised and sold, likely through breaches of government databases. The leaked data included mobile subscriber details, call logs, copies of ID cards (CNICs), vehicle registrations, and even records of officials’ foreign travel. Investigations pointed towards weaknesses in NADRA’s data systems or misuse of login credentials that allowed unauthorized extraction of data – for instance, insiders or hackers abusing the interface between NADRA and telecom operators (used for SIM verification) to pull out citizen information. 

In March 2024, the issue gained national attention when it was discovered that information of all mobile SIM holders (including that of a sitting Interior Minister) was available for sale on the internet. Packages of personal data were being peddled cheaply (e.g., someone’s mobile location history for Rs 500, full call/SMS record for Rs 2,000), indicating an underground market for Pakistani data. The government responded by forming special investigation teams to crack down on those responsible for the leak. PTA reportedly blocked over 1300 websites and apps that were illicitly trading citizens’ data. Additionally, Pakistan’s National CERT (PKCERT) issued advisories about global data breaches affecting millions of Pakistanis’ credentials, warning people to change passwords and practice good cyber hygiene. 

These incidents highlight a pressing privacy and security problem – Pakistan’s databases (whether held by government authorities like NADRA or by private service providers) have not been adequately secured against data theft. Without an enacted data protection law, there’s limited accountability or recourse when such breaches occur. Lesson: Data leaks erode public trust and can fuel identity theft and fraud. Pakistan will need stronger data governance, encryption of sensitive info, and stricter access controls to prevent insider leaks or intrusions. The formation of investigative teams is reactive; the aim should be to plug the systemic holes that allowed 2.7 million records to leak over years undetected. 

Case Study 5: Ongoing Cybercrime and Fraud – The Ubiquitous Threat to Citizens. 
Not all impactful cyber incidents are large-scale hacks; many are continuous, low-to-medium scale cybercrimes that cumulatively cost Pakistan’s economy and citizens greatly. For example: 

• Online Financial Frauds: In recent years, Pakistan has seen waves of phishing scams targeting bank customers via SMS (“SIM jacking” texts) or phone calls (fraudsters pretending to be from banks or telcos). Thousands have fallen victim to account takeovers or unauthorized transfers. In 2023 alone, one leading cybersecurity firm reported blocking 16 million cyber attacks in Pakistan (a 17% year-on-year increase), showing how frequent attempts have become. 

• Defacement and Denial-of-Service Attacks: Hacktivist groups, especially in the India-Pakistan context, regularly engage in website defacements. Pakistani websites (mostly government or educational domains) have been taken down or had their content replaced with political messages by Indian hackers, and vice versa. Similarly, during diplomatic flare-ups, government sites have faced DDoS attacks. For instance, amidst tensions in 2025, Pakistani officials reported increased DDoS attempts on government networks from foreign sources. 

• Malware Campaigns and Botnets: Pakistan’s large internet user base has been targeted by global malware like Emotet, Zeus, and various remote-access Trojans. Many users’ PCs become part of botnets due to lack of updated antivirus, which can then be used to launch attacks. The country has had to work with international agencies to mitigate botnet infestations (e.g., Microsoft and others partnering with PTA to notify ISPs of infected IPs). 

These “everyday” cyber issues are perhaps less glamorous than state-level hacks but are equally important to address. They indicate Pakistan needs to bolster grassroots cybersecurity – educating users, enhancing ISPs’ network security, and ensuring law enforcement can handle the volume of cybercrime complaints (which NR3C is often overwhelmed by). 

Each of these case studies reinforces themes discussed in earlier sections: Pakistan has been tested by serious cyber incidents, revealing both improvements and failings. The banking breach showed the system reacting and adapting (a plus in resilience), whereas the FBR hack exposed shortcomings in preparedness. The KE and NADRA cases highlight critical infrastructure and data protection woes. Together, they make clear that cybersecurity in Pakistan is not abstract – real attacks have happened and will happen, affecting national security, economy, and personal privacy. 

In the next section, we delve deeper into how these cyber issues intersect with Pakistan’s national security strategy, economic stability, protection of critical sectors, and the privacy rights of citizens. 

Cybersecurity’s Intersection with National Security, Economic Stability, and Society 

Cybersecurity in Pakistan is not merely an IT concern – it sits at the crossroads of national security, economic stability, protection of critical services, and individual rights. This section examines how weaknesses or improvements in cybersecurity impact these broader domains: 

1. National Security: Pakistan’s national security apparatus increasingly views cybersecurity as an integral component of defense. As detailed, the military conflict with India has a cyber dimension – securing defense networks and communication channels is vital to prevent espionage or sabotage by adversaries. Cyber intelligence is now part of military planning; for instance, ensuring that command-and-control systems are hardened against hacking is as important as physical security. A breach in sensitive defense data (e.g., missile system software or troop deployment info) could be as damaging as a physical incursion. Additionally, terrorist and extremist elements exploit cyberspace to coordinate and spread propaganda. Thus, robust cyber monitoring helps preempt terror plots and dismantle online radicalization efforts, directly contributing to internal security. 

On the flip side, cybersecurity tools can be turned into cyber offense in service of national security. There have been claims (though unverified) that Pakistani agencies have conducted offensive cyber operations against hostile targets (for example, disabling an opponent’s critical systems during a conflict). While Pakistan officially emphasizes a defensive cyber posture, in practice it likely maintains some offensive capabilities as a deterrent and for intelligence gathering – common among nations with active security threats. 

Importantly, strong cybersecurity also protects Pakistan’s sovereignty in a digital sense. A cyberattack that cripples government functions (like the FBR hack did briefly) can undermine public confidence in the state’s ability to govern and protect. In extreme scenarios, foreign actors could attempt to influence political processes via cyber means (such as hacking election systems or conducting information warfare through social media). Thus, cybersecurity is linked to sovereignty and political stability. Pakistan’s leadership recognizes this: for example, the National Security Policy 2022 explicitly cited cyber threats as part of non-traditional security challenges that the country must address alongside traditional defense. 

2. Economic Stability and Growth: Pakistan’s economy is increasingly digital – from online banking and e-commerce to IT exports – making cybersecurity an economic priority. Cyberattacks carry hefty economic costs. The average cost of a data breach globally runs in the millions of dollars when you factor in response expenses, downtime, and reputation damage. In Pakistan’s case, consider the economic ripple effects of the incidents we saw: 

• The 2021 FBR breach halted tax collection and trade clearances for days, affecting revenue and trade flows. 

• Repeated banking frauds can deter people from using digital financial services, hampering the push for a cashless economy. 

• If investors perceive Pakistan’s digital infrastructure as insecure, they might be hesitant to invest in the tech sector or digital initiatives. Conversely, a secure digital environment builds investor confidence and is “a precondition for economic participation” in the modern world. 

• Cyber threats to stock markets or payment systems could directly hit financial stability. Imagine a scenario where a cyber incident disrupts the Pakistan Stock Exchange or the inter-bank payment network – it could trigger financial panic. 

On the positive side, strengthening cybersecurity can be an economic opportunity. It creates demand for cybersecurity services, spurring the growth of local cybersecurity firms and startups. Pakistan’s IT industry can capitalize on the need for security products, creating jobs and exports (e.g., Pakistani companies offering software or services in encryption, threat intelligence, etc.). Already, capacity-building like training youth in cybersecurity is seen as skill development for a future workforce that can earn income domestically and abroad. Also, achieving a high global cybersecurity ranking aids Pakistan’s case to integrate into the global digital economy (for instance, complying with EU data protection standards could help Pakistani businesses work with European clients). 

In summary, economic security and cybersecurity go hand in hand: a secure digital foundation protects current economic activities and enables future growth in sectors like fintech, e-government, and digital trade. Neglecting cybersecurity can impose hidden “taxes” on the economy through fraud losses, reduced efficiency, and missed investment. 

3. Critical Infrastructure (Banking, Telecom, Energy, etc.): Critical infrastructures are the backbone of daily life and national well-being. Cyber threats to these sectors can have devastating, cascading effects: 

• Banking and Finance: Trust is the currency of banking. A major cyber incident (like a hack that wipes account records or empties ATMs) could spark a bank run or loss of faith in financial institutions. Banks hold citizens’ savings and facilitate commerce; their systems going down, even for hours, can paralyze economic activity. Thus, the banking sector’s cyber defenses are essentially part of national infrastructure protection. This is why SBP’s regulations require strong controls and drills for banks. 

• Telecommunications: Nearly every sector depends on telecom networks (internet and phone). A cyberattack on telecom – whether knocking out services via DDoS or manipulating routing – could isolate parts of the country, disrupt emergency communications, and affect military command chains. Moreover, telecom outages hamper businesses and daily communications. Recognizing this, PTA’s establishment of a telecom SOC (NTSOC) is aimed at preventing such scenarios. The telecom sector in Pakistan has seen incidents like the temporary blocking of entire networks (e.g., during protests or security operations, sometimes deliberately by authorities). A malicious actor causing a telecom blackout would be seen as an act of cyber warfare. 

• Energy (Power, Oil/Gas): Energy infrastructure is a top target for nation-state attackers globally. Pakistan’s electricity grid, if digitally sabotaged, could cause blackouts impacting hospitals, industry, and civilian life – essentially grinding the country to a halt. The 2020 KE ransomware attack was a small taste of what could happen; while that mainly hit business systems, it showed the power sector’s exposure. In 2022, there were reports of attempted cyber intrusions into Pakistan’s power distribution companies (nothing publicly confirmed in detail). A successful attack could not only cause economic loss but also erode citizens’ trust in the state’s ability to provide basic services. 

• Transportation: Modern transport (airlines, railways, traffic control) relies heavily on IT. Pakistan’s airlines have had reservation system outages that, while not necessarily cyberattacks, exhibit similar impacts to cyber incidents (grounded flights, chaos at airports). A deliberate cyberattack could disrupt signals on rail networks or air traffic control – causing accidents or halting movement. Ensuring these systems are secure is part of overall critical infrastructure defense. 

Because these sectors are so vital, cybersecurity intersects with public safety and national resilience. Pakistan’s approach has been to start classifying some systems as “critical information infrastructure” under its policy and ensure they get priority protection. However, as noted, a formal designation and enforcement of standards is still in progress. Public-private cooperation is absolutely essential here, since most critical infrastructure (banks, telcos, energy companies) in Pakistan are privately operated or commercially run. The state can provide intelligence and coordination (through CERTs or security clearances to share threat info) while the operators must invest in robust security measures. A failure in any critical sector due to cyberattack would be felt widely, which is why improving cybersecurity in these areas is tantamount to protecting the health, safety, and prosperity of the nation. 

4. Data Privacy and Citizen Trust: With increasing digitization (national ID database, online health records, e-government portals), data privacy has become a societal concern in Pakistan. Cybersecurity and privacy go together: a breach of security often means a breach of privacy. The absence of a data protection law until now has left citizens with little control or recourse when their personal data is mishandled. When leaks like the 2.7 million records occur, it not only threatens security (through identity theft, fraud) but also violates privacy on a huge scale. People expect the government to safeguard the sensitive information they collect (be it for issuing ID cards or passports) and similarly expect companies (banks, telcos) to guard their personal data. Failure to do so undermines public trust in digital services. For example, if people fear their information will end up on the dark web, they might avoid using online systems, hampering e-governance initiatives and the digital economy. 

Moreover, cybersecurity measures themselves must be balanced with privacy rights. There have been debates in Pakistan around surveillance vs. privacy – e.g., the use of broad powers under PECA to access data can raise concerns of overreach. The challenge is to ensure security forces have the tools to catch criminals and terrorists online, while preventing misuse of those tools to infringe on law-abiding citizens’ privacy or free speech. The Personal Data Protection Bill, when enacted, should introduce oversight (like a Data Protection Authority) which could also influence how cybersecurity is practiced (through requirements for consent, data minimization, etc.). In essence, citizen trust in the digital ecosystem will depend on feeling both secure and that their rights are respected. Cybersecurity that is overly intrusive can be counterproductive if it leads to public backlash. Hence, Pakistan must aim for an approach that secures data and maintains transparency and accountability in how that data is protected or monitored. 

5. Societal Impact – Digital Divide and Inclusion: A final point is that cybersecurity intersects with social issues like the digital divide. Pakistan has a diverse user base – from highly tech-savvy urban youth to rural populations new to the internet. Cybersecurity strategies must account for this diversity. For instance, expecting every user to know how to detect phishing is unrealistic; there must be protections built into systems (like safe defaults, two-factor authentication by service providers). If cybersecurity is too complex or burdensome, marginalized groups might opt out of digital services, worsening digital inequality. Conversely, user-friendly security (such as interfaces in local languages, outreach programs to educate in simple terms) can empower more people to use the internet safely, bringing socio-economic benefits. A secure digital environment encourages more people to come online, use e-banking, telemedicine, e-learning, etc., amplifying social development. Therefore, cybersecurity policy in Pakistan also has an element of ensuring equitable access – making sure protections extend to all and not just the “digitally elite”. 

In summary, cybersecurity in Pakistan is deeply interwoven with the country’s security, economy, critical functioning, and citizen welfare. A strong cybersecurity posture acts as a shield guarding national defense, keeping the economy running smoothly, protecting essential services, and preserving citizens’ privacy and trust. Weak cybersecurity, by contrast, can act as a crack through which threats seep, undermining everything from military readiness to everyday banking transactions. Recognizing these high stakes is key to garnering the political will and societal support for improving cybersecurity. 

Finally, we turn to actionable strategies and policy recommendations that can help Pakistan address its weaknesses and further strengthen its cybersecurity ecosystem for the future. 

Strategies and Policy Recommendations for Improving Pakistan’s Cybersecurity Ecosystem 

Building on the analysis above, here are practical, actionable recommendations for Pakistan to enhance its cybersecurity. These suggestions target policy, operational measures, and capacity development, aiming to create a more secure and resilient cyber ecosystem: 

1. Establish a Central Cybersecurity Authority: To remedy fragmented governance, Pakistan should empower a single lead agency or coordination body for cybersecurity. This could be a National Cybersecurity Authority or Center directly under the Prime Minister or National Security Division. Its role: to unify efforts of MoITT, PTA, FIA, defense and others, serve as the central brain for cyber strategy, and avoid duplication. The Cyber Governance Policy Committee (CGPC) created by the 2021 policy is a start, but it needs an operational arm. Formally expanding the mandate of the NCERT (once fully operational) to act as the national focal point – not just for incident response but for overall cybersecurity coordination – could be one approach. With representation from key stakeholders, such an authority should draft cohesive action plans and ensure accountability for implementation across ministries. This will address the current “silo” problem and make decision-making faster during cyber crises. 

2. Fast-Track Legal Reforms (Data Protection and Cybercrime Upgrades): The government must prioritize passing the Personal Data Protection Bill and establishing the Data Protection Authority. This law will set baseline standards for data security in both public and private sectors, mandate breach notifications, and thereby push organizations to harden their systems. It will also reassure citizens about privacy. Alongside, PECA 2016 should be reviewed and amended to fill gaps – for instance, adding explicit provisions for critical infrastructure protection and powers to mandate security audits in key sectors. Mandatory minimum cybersecurity standards for critical sectors can be introduced via regulations under an amended law. Additionally, considering the evolving threat landscape, new issues like cyberbullying, deepfakes, or AI-driven cybercrime might need legal recognition. Regular reviews of cyber laws will keep them up to date. Finally, Pakistan should consider engaging with international legal frameworks: even if not joining the Budapest Convention, it can sign more bilateral agreements/MoUs for cybercrime cooperation to expedite evidence sharing with countries from where attacks originate. 

3. Boost Resources and Training for Law Enforcement and Judiciary: The FIA’s NR3C and provincial cybercrime police units (if any) need a substantial uplift in capacity. This means increasing budget allocations for hiring specialized personnel (ethical hackers, forensic experts) and procuring modern equipment (for decrypting devices, analyzing malware). International partnerships can be leveraged to train NR3C staff – for example, collaborating with countries like Turkey, Malaysia, or EU agencies that have advanced cyber police units. Also, sensitizing the judiciary is crucial: workshops for judges and prosecutors on cybercrime and digital evidence handling will help improve prosecution outcomes. Specialized cybercrime courts or at least dedicated judges in major cities could be designated to handle cyber cases swiftly. Improving conviction rates and enforcement will strengthen deterrence – cybercriminals currently exploit the slow, nascent legal process. Publicizing successful prosecutions of high-profile cybercriminals can also deter would-be offenders. 

4. Develop a Skilled Cybersecurity Workforce Pipeline: Addressing the talent shortage requires long-term planning. Pakistan should integrate cybersecurity education at multiple levels: 

• University Level: Encourage more universities to offer cybersecurity degrees and research programs. Provide scholarships or incentives for students to specialize in cybersecurity (similar to how engineers are groomed). The National Centre for Cyber Security (NCCS) can be expanded to fund research and internships, ensuring academia works on real-world problems facing Pakistan. 

• Professional Training: Establish a National Cybersecurity Training Academy (perhaps as part of the National Information Technology Board or NITB) to offer continuous professional development for IT staff in government and critical industries. This academy can certify government officers in cybersecurity management, much like how civil servants undergo administrative training. 

• Public-Private Internships and Exchanges: Foster partnerships between government and private tech companies to exchange talent and expertise. For instance, allow tech company security teams to embed temporarily with CERTs or law enforcement to share knowledge, and vice versa, have government experts spend sabbaticals in industry to learn cutting-edge practices. 

• Awareness in Society: Continue and expand public awareness campaigns. Cybersecurity should become part of digital literacy programs at schools and for the general public (through TV, social media, community workshops). Simple habits like using strong passwords, updating software, and being cautious with unknown links can drastically reduce the success of attacks like phishing. 

Pakistan’s recent accession to the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (GFCE) can facilitate some of these capacity-building initiatives by connecting with international training resources. The country should actively participate in global cyber drills and skill competitions (such as CyberSTAR or Capture-the-Flag contests) to benchmark and improve the skills of its experts. 

5. Strengthen Critical Infrastructure Security through Regulation and Collaboration: It’s imperative to protect critical sectors by setting clear expectations and enabling better cooperation: 

• Regulatory Standards: Use the policy mandate to officially designate critical information infrastructure operators and impose cybersecurity compliance requirements. For example, require power grid companies to implement the IEC 62443 standard for industrial control security, or mandate that banks achieve ISO 27001 certification for information security management. PTA’s directives to telecom companies under CTDISR are a model – similar sector-specific rules should come from bodies like the State Bank (for non-bank financial institutions too), Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (for nuclear facilities’ IT), and others. 

• Sectoral CERT Forums: Build on the three-tier CERT plan by convening regular forums for each sector’s cybersecurity teams to share information. A Financial Sector CERT forum under SBP could discuss threats to banks and coordinate on any systemic risk. An Energy Sector Cybersecurity Working Group could do the same for power, oil, gas companies, with NTISB/NCERT providing threat intel. These should meet frequently and also run joint cyber drills to test incident response. Drawing inspiration from NATO’s Locked Shields exercises, Pakistan can run national drills simulating, say, a cyberattack on the power grid, to practice coordination. 

• Information Sharing and Early Warning: Introduce or enhance platforms for real-time threat intelligence sharing among trusted entities (possibly using automated means). If one bank detects a new malware targeting banking apps, that IoC (indicator of compromise) should quickly reach others through the NCERT or sector CERT. The NCERT can maintain a national threat portal with up-to-date alerts. Partner with global cybersecurity companies (like antivirus firms, Microsoft, etc.) for threat feeds relevant to Pakistan. Given resource constraints, tapping into international info exchanges is cost-effective. 

• Emergency Response Plans: Ensure each critical organization has an incident response plan and crisis communication strategy. The government should also have a national cyber crisis management plan – defining how to handle a major cyber catastrophe (who takes lead, how to involve the military if needed, how to communicate to the public to prevent panic, etc.). This is analogous to disaster management plans for earthquakes or floods, but for cyber. 

6. Enhance International Cooperation and Intelligence Sharing: Despite sovereignty concerns, Pakistan can proactively engage in selective international cooperation to improve its cybersecurity posture: 

• Join Cybersecurity Alliances/Exercises: Beyond the UN forums, consider joining regional alliances like the OIC-CERT (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation’s CERT network) to collaborate with friendly countries on threat intel and training. Pakistan has participated in OIC-CERT drills through PISA; formal membership can institutionalize that. 

• Cyber Diplomacy: Use diplomatic channels to address cyber threats emanating from abroad. For instance, if evidence shows a hacker group operating from Country X targeting Pakistan, engage that country’s authorities to take action (presenting evidence via FIA–Interpol coordination). Similarly, improve cooperation with neighboring countries like China and Iran on cybersecurity issues that affect the region (such as controlling cross-border cybercrime). 

• Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs): Update or sign MLATs that explicitly cover electronic evidence and cybercrime, making it easier to prosecute criminals who operate internationally. This is crucial for crimes like the 2018 bank data theft, where perpetrators might be overseas. 

• International Standards Adoption: Align Pakistani cybersecurity frameworks with international standards to facilitate cooperation. For example, adopting frameworks like the NIST Cybersecurity Framework or participating in the FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams) can open doors to global best practices and assistance. 

7. Invest in Indigenous Technology and R&D: Reducing reliance on foreign technology in critical areas can improve security (and is a goal in the cyber policy). Pakistan should encourage local development of cybersecurity solutions – whether it’s encryption tools, secure communication apps, or even hardware. Initiatives like funding startups through Ignite (the national tech fund) to work on cybersecurity products can yield home-grown solutions tailored to local needs. Indigenous capability is also important given global supply chain threats; for instance, trust in foreign software/hardware is sometimes jeopardized by backdoors (as seen in debates over telecom equipment). While Pakistan cannot make everything itself, it can identify priority domains (perhaps secure mobile OS for government use, or locally hosted cloud services for sensitive data) and invest in those. Furthermore, supporting R&D at university labs via NCCS and similar centers will build expertise. A portion of defense R&D budget could be allocated to cyber defense research as well. 

8. Public-Private Partnership and Information Sharing Culture: Build a culture of trust where private companies feel safe to disclose incidents and collaborate with authorities. Often companies fear reputational damage or regulatory punishment if they admit to breaches. A good practice is to institute voluntary reporting mechanisms – e.g., an anonymized reporting channel where companies can share incident details with NCERT without immediate blame, focusing on learning and collective defense. The government, on its part, should pass Cybersecurity Safe Harbor laws that encourage businesses to implement certain security standards and if they do so, they get some liability protection in case of breaches. This approach, tried in some jurisdictions, incentivizes companies to improve security proactively. Also, organizing regular multi-stakeholder dialogues (government, industry, academia) through conferences or task forces can break down barriers. The challenges are complex enough that no single entity can handle them – collaboration is the only force multiplier. 

9. Protecting Digital Rights While Securing Cyberspace: As Pakistan tightens cybersecurity, it should simultaneously embed protections for civil liberties to ensure an open yet secure internet. This means clear oversight on any surveillance activities, judicial warrants for accessing private data (as PECA requires), and transparency reports to the public about cyber threats and how they’re handled. Engage civil society and tech community in crafting laws so that measures like the E-Safety law (which was contentious) or others find a balance between security and freedom online. By doing so, the government can build public support for cybersecurity initiatives – citizens will cooperate (such as reporting cyber incidents, following security guidelines) more readily if they trust that these efforts are for security and not for undue control. 

10. Continuous Evaluation and Adaptation: Cybersecurity is a moving target – threats evolve, and so must defenses. Pakistan should institute a mechanism for continuous evaluation of its cybersecurity posture. Annual reports or audits could be conducted by an independent body (maybe under the Auditor General or a parliamentary committee) to assess how well agencies are implementing security controls and where gaps persist. The findings can guide the next year’s priorities. Additionally, staying updated with global trends – like the rise of artificial intelligence in cyber attacks or new types of malware – is important. Pakistan might consider creating a Cyber Threat Forecasting group that scans the horizon for emerging risks (for example, threats to IoT devices as smart cities develop, or quantum computing’s impact on encryption) and advises on preemptive measures. 

Implementing these recommendations will not be trivial – it requires political commitment, resources, and coordination. However, given the growing dependence on cyberspace for Pakistan’s national security and economic vision (e.g., the “Digital Pakistan” initiative), these investments are not optional; they are necessary to safeguard the country’s future. Encouragingly, Pakistan has shown the capacity to improve (as evidenced by its better GCI ranking and steps like NCERT). By following through on a comprehensive roadmap – strengthening governance, laws, skills, infrastructure security, and international partnerships – Pakistan can move from a reactive stance to a proactive, resilient cybersecurity posture. 

Conclusion 

Pakistan stands at a critical juncture in its cybersecurity journey. The past decade has underscored that cybersecurity is no longer a niche IT issue, but a cornerstone of national strength – influencing everything from defense and diplomacy to banking and basic services. This deep-dive overview reveals a dual narrative: significant strides alongside stubborn shortcomings. On one hand, Pakistan has laid solid groundwork by enacting cybercrime laws, formulating a national policy, improving its global index rankings, and setting up structures like the National CERT and sectoral SOCs. On the other hand, cyber threats have outpaced these efforts at times, exposing gaps – be it a major data breach that compromised millions of citizens’ data or a crippling attack on a government server that highlighted operational lapses. 

The key takeaway is that cybersecurity is a continuous process, not a one-time goal. Pakistan must consolidate its structural reforms (turn policy into practice swiftly), invest in people and technology, and inculcate a security mindset across government and society. Success will mean not just fending off routine cyberattacks, but also confidently engaging in the global digital economy knowing its systems are robust, and cooperating internationally to combat threats while preserving national interests. The decisions made today – in law-making, budgeting, education, and diplomacy – will shape Pakistan’s cyber resilience for years to come. 

In the global context, Pakistan’s ability to safeguard its digital frontiers will also determine its standing as a secure place to do business and a responsible player in cyberspace norms. Embracing a comprehensive approach, as this blog outlined, can enable Pakistan to navigate the evolving complexities of the cyber world and emerge stronger. The challenges are real and ever-evolving, but with deliberate action and strategic planning, Pakistan can transform its cybersecurity landscape from a developing framework into a mature, dynamic shield that protects its national interests and citizens in the digital age. 

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